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                   Free Trade: What Now?
By
Jagdish Bhagwati
This is the text of the Keynote Address delivered at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, on
25th May 1998, on the occasion of the International Management Symposium at which the 1998
Freedom Prize of the Max Schmidheiny Foundation was awarded.
Ever since Adam Smith invented the case for free trade over two centuries ago in The
Wealth of Nations, and founded in the same great work the science of Economics as we know it
today, international economists have been kept busy defending free trade.  A popular children’s
story in the United States, by Dr. Seuss, has the refrain “And the cat came back”. The opponents
of free trade, ranging from hostile protectionists to the mere skeptics, have kept coming back
with ever new objections.
The critiques we have had to confront have often come from those who fail to understand
the essential insight of Adam Smith: that it pays me to specialize on what I do b st compare  to
you, even though I can do everything better than you do. Economists call this the Law of
Comparative Advantage: each nation would profit from noncoercive free trade that would lead to
such specialization. When asked by the famous mathematician Ulam: “What is the most
counterintuitive result in Economics?”, the Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson chose this Law as his
candidate.1
Skeptics within Economics
But the most compelling skeptics have come repeatedly from wi hin the discipline of
Economics itself. To see why, it is necessary to understand that the case for free trade is, at an
essential level, the case for markets. Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand will guide you to an efficient
allocation of resources only if the markets yield prices that reflect “true” social costs. If there are
                                                
1 I would agree with him, though my longer exposure to politicians has produced other examples that can nearly
match Samuelson’s. My favourite is the fallacy that Japan is “obviously” pr tectionist because it has a trade surplus.
By this token, Japan became more, not less pr ectionist, in the last several years when it changed to a surplus while
lowering trade barriers simultaneously!
market failures, as when a producer pollutes the air but does not have to pay for this pollution,
then the Invisible Hand can lead  you in the wrong direction. Or to put it in flamboyant terms,
free trade can immiserize you.
So, in virtually each generation, economists have discovered new, or focused anew on
old,  market failures that will undermine the case for free trade. In fact, John Stuart Mill, over
150 years ago, stated the case for infant industry protection succinctly though naturally not with
the sophistication that it commands today: the losses faced by such an industry were presumably
outweighed by the social gains from supporting it.
Then again, we all know how, when the world economy was afflicted by the Great
Depression, John Maynard Keynes broke ranks with England’s free traders: again, when you
have massive unemployment due to lack of aggregate demand, tariffs can switch demand from
foreign to domestic goods and thus create employment and income; and, in formal terms, market
wages no longer represent the true social cost of (unemployed) labour.
And, when Edward Chamberlin  of Harvard and Joan Robinson of developed their new
theories of monopolistic or imperfect competition in 1929 and 1931 respectively, and also
directly addressed (even if unsatisfactorily) oligopolistic competition among firms (in what was
then called the case of “small-group” competition), it was immediately obvious that such
imperfections constituted market failures, so that any belief in their practical importance would
tend to undermine the faith in the doctrine of free trade. As a result,  the 1930s were
characterised by what John Hicks, a free trader and later Nobel laureate, described as “nihilism”:
if markets were imperfect, it was no longer possible to believe in the efficiency  of free trade.
What we witnessed in the 1980s, with assertions that “strategic trade theory”, based on
oligopolistic competition, had undermined the case for free trade, was in essence then merely a
replay of this “crisis of free trade” that Hicks described so eloquently in 1951 in a brilliant lecture
to the Manchester Statistical Society in the following eloquent words:
“the Monopoly-Competition argument [against Free Trade]…is of much less practical
consequence than the others [such as the macroeconomic argument that led to Keynes’s
defection], but it deserves at least a passing mention, because of the undoubted influence which it
undoubtedly exercises --- in a negative sort of way --- upon the minds of economics students… If
apparent costs [as reflected in market prices] only equal true [social] costs under conditions of
perfect competition, and competition hardly ever is perfect, the bottom seems to drop out of the
Free Trade argument. This is in fact a fair description of the state of mind which quite a number
of economics students seem to have reached.”
The difference from the 1930s was that the production of the same play was more garish and
dramatic. Where Hicks had described the damage to free trade as minor, the damage to it in the
1980s was more potent. Partly, the arguments fell this time into a context of what I have called
the “diminished giant syndrome” in the United States, where the rise of Japan, and the fear that
the oligopolistic competition among the giant firms of the Trilateral powers would be won by
countries whose governments aided the competitive strength of their “national champions”,
focused attention fiercely on imperfect competition and how protection would, or could, aid
governments in this “strategic” competition.
This renewal of the 1930s worries was aided analytically by the fact that developments in
the theory of industrial organization had prepared the profession to analyze the implications of
oligopolistic competition much better than ever before. Aiding the entire process, where free
trade was widely denounced in the media and policy circles as an obsolete theoretical doctrine,
was the activism of some of the proponents of the trade theory built on imperfect competition.
Among them, the most prominent was my distinguished pupil, Paul Krugman, fortunately now
an articulate  convert back to free trade, who extensively wrote and lectured on how the “new”
theory of trade under imperfect competition  had shown that, at a theoretical level, the case for
free trade was “passe”. One of my many other pupils who was clearing his files, sent me just a
few weeks ago a 1991 article of Krugman from an influential Washington magazine, with the
title: “Protectionism: Try it, You will like It”!2
The Return of Free Trade
If you survey the academic scene in the 1990s, however, the economist  defectors from
the doctrine of free trade have returned to the fold; indeed today, there is harmony of agreement
among the major economists on this policy position. A huge part of the reason is that the theory
of free trade, and here I may self-indulgently on this occasion lay some claim to authorship of the
idea,  now distinguishes between two propositions:
(1) if market failures remain unfixed, free trade can harm rather than help; and
(2) if market failures are fixed through suitable policy intervention, then free trade
can once again be used to exploit best the gains from trade.
Within the second proposition, economists also emphasize that3:
 If the market failure arises  in domestic markets, then the appropriate policy
intervention is the use of domestic policy directly targeted at the market failure,
while free trade is maintained externally.
So, in a very sophisticated sense, international economists today have come around to looking at
market failures very differently from their predecessors: whereas the earlier economists drew
away from free trade and accepted protectionism in a knee-jerk fashion when faced by market
failures, today’s economists say: fix those failures through appropriate policies and
                                                
2 I should say that the titles of papers in magazines and newspapers are not chosen by the authors. But, in this
instance as other essays written at the time, Krugman’s conclusions were indeed broadly consonant with the title
quoted in the text above.
3 This is known today as The Theory of Domestic Distortions and Policy Intervention.
simultaneously get on with free trade.  Free trade and these market-failure-fixing policies then
become bedfellows.
In fact, a simple intuitive way to understand all this is also to recall the wisdom of our
forefathers in virtually every culture : yo  cannot kill two birds with one stone(leaving out
fluke success, of course). So, if you seek to do that, you will likely miss both birds. Nowhere is
this better illustrated than in the debate between environmentalists and free traders. I shall return
below to other dimensions of that debate; but an important set of differences among the two arise
simply because many  environmental groups fail to appreciate that, if  market failure afflicts
pollution because there is no enforcement of the polluter pay principle, we free traders realize
immediately from our theory  that:
(1) free trade can hurt both income and the environment; but we also realize that so
can protection (compared to free trade);  nd that
(2) (the two targets of) income and the environment will be efficiently pursued by a
simultaneous adoption of ( the two policy instruments) free trade and the
polluter pay principle.
So, by invoking simultaneous adoption of suitable market-failure-eliminating policies we
can rescue free trade finally from the iron fist aimed at it by the conventional market-failure
critics over nearly two centuries. Thus, for instance, the answer to Keynes is that, if you manage
to reflate and increase aggregate demand directly, you can return to free trade: using tariffs to
switch given aggregate demand from others to your own goods is to use a policy that simply
switches employment from others to us, but does not increase world employment while
damaging gains from trade by cluttering up the trading system with  restrictions and, almost
certainly, retaliatory trade restrictions by others trying to switch employment back to their own
goods in a process that Joan Robinson called “beggar my neighbour” policies!
In fact, that prompts me to admit that the theoretical case for free trade with appropriate
other  non-protectionist policies aimed at fixing market failures directly has one problem: the
market failure in question may itself require an appropriate response in the form of  trade tariffs.
That does happen to be theoretically the  case when there is imperfect competition in products:
trade tariffs or subsidies can be shown to improve national welfare over what free trade would
yield. In fact, this is only a sophisticated extension of the case made by Robert Torrens, again
over 150 years ago; like a monopolist who restricts his sales to increase prices and profits, a
nation enjoying monopoly power in world markets can do the same. In short, if the nation adopts
free trade instead, it is not maximizing its own income by not fixing a “market failure” under free
trade: i.e. its failure to exercise monopoly power. So, here we do have a hole in the reinvigorated
case for free trade.
But then, much in the spirit of the rejection of Torrens’ argument when free trade was
embraced by Prime Minister Robert Peel with the repeal of the Corn Laws, we can still retain
free trade as a reasonable policy by citing three quite persuasive arguments:4
· “There is no beef”:  We could argue, as theorists of imperfect competition in trade
(such as Avinash Dixit and Gene Grossman of Princeton) have done, that there is no
evidence of significant enough imperfections for us to abandon free trade.
· “The Visible Hand will make matters worse”:  Or, we could take the stronger,
definitely conservative, position (as Paul Krugman, among many others, has done)
                                                
4 I have dealt with some of these arguments at greater length in my  1988 Bernhard Harms Prize acceptance speech
entitled “Is Free Trade Passe After All?” and elsewhere.
that, if protectionist intervention is attempted, it will make matters worse because
governmental interventions will reflect lobbying rather than social advantage.
· “Retaliation will ruin any chance of one’s protection paying off”:  As a corollary
of the preceding argument, it is not one’s own folly in choosing protection unwisely
that we will hurt ourselves by abandoning free trade, but it is because other nations
will retaliate and everyone will lose, if in varying degrees, from the breakdown of free
trade.
And, so, between the new theoretical arguments where domestic market failures can be fixed best
through non-protectionist domestic policies while retaining free trade as the best trade policy, and
the new (essentially but not exclusively) empirical contentions that intervention is unnecessary or
counterproductive when the market failure spills over into the external markets and must itself be
fixed in principle through protection (singly or in conjunction with other policies), economists
today have returned in hordes back to free trade. The latest revolt, of the 1980s, has died down.
Only neanderthals among the economists now militate against free trade: unfortunately, they will
never lack an audience but fortunately, they have little effect presently.
The Critics in the Public Arena
The real threats to free trade today come from altogether different directions. I have time
only to focus on two today:
· Trade Hurts Wages: There is widespread concern that trade with poor countries will
produce paupers in the rich countries; and
· “Fair Trade” before Free Trade: There are increasing concerns that free trade
between countries that are different on a host of conventionally “domestic”
institutions and policies is “unfair” and hence preconditions concerning
harmonization of standards must be required of trade treaties.
1.Trade and Wages
A furiously compelling worry about free trade (and investments) has come from the fact
that it is a prime candidate for explaining the phenomenon that, since the 1980s until very
recently, the real wages of unskilled workers in the United States have fallen and then stagnated.
In Western Europe, the pressure on the working class is believed to take instead  the form of high
unemployment because the labour markets are far more flexible in the United States.
The argument is not the old fallacy that free trade with poor countries is bad for your
aggregate income, that your country will be immiserized by such trade. Rather, it is an income
distributional argument: while the country gains, the poor will be immiserized, the poor actually
getting a smaller slice from the enlarged pie. The mindset behind this argument, of course, is that
the progressive inclusion of the poor countries into the world trading system will effectively
expand the unskilled labour force in the world economy, driving down the real wages of workers.
In fact, Paul Samuelson had written a pair of articles in 1948 and 1949 on what economists call
the Factor Price Equalization (FPE) theorem where free trade would drive wages into quality
everywhere.
Regarded as a theoretical curiosum at the time, the FPE theorem  is now thought instead
to provide the compelling reason for the immiseration of the rich countries’ proletariat: in an
ultimate irony, Marx, whose prediction of falling wages of workers was proven false by history
for the 19th century is now striking again with the aid of a neoclassical economist, Paul
Samuelson! But I believe that Marx is destined to fail again. The evidence for the assertion that it
is trade with poor countries that is increasing the numbers of the poor, and accentuating their
poverty in turn, is simply not compelling.
Needless to say, this is a matter that has engaged the analytical attention of numerous
economists. Many, including Robert Lawrence and Matthew Slaughter, have argued that the
contribution of trade to the phenomenon is n gligible whereas my own research has led me to
believe that trade has actually had a favour ble ffect, moderating the fall in real wages of the
unskilled that is being driven by technical change that economizes greatly on the use of unskilled
labour.5 It is hard therefore to believe how economists, among them Dani Rodrik in his
unpersuasive but popular pamphlet on Has Globalization Gone too Far? issued by Mr.
Bergsten’s Institute for International Economics in Washington  (which also released on the
Washington scene, when Mr. Clinton first came to his Presidency, Laura Tyson’s flawed but  at-
the-time influential Japan-obsessed pamphlet recommending industrial policy), can assert that
there is some sort of consensus among economists that trade accounts for a 15-20% of the fall in
real wages in the 1980s and beyond!  It is hard enough for us to keep educating the citizens and
groups that agitate against free trade because of unsubstantiated but real fears. It is mortifying
that we have to use our energies also to fight the fires fanned by the economists and think tanks
that should set themselves higher standards of scientific argumentation and veracity.6
But if trade with the poorcountries, or for that matter investments in them, should not be
a matter for concern in regard to its income distributional effects, and we can revert to accepting
                                                
5 I have presented my favourable findings in “Play it Again Sam: Yet Another Look at Trade and Wages”, June
1997; Columbia University mimeo.; to be published in a festschrift volume in honour of T.N.Srinivasan of Yale by
Elsevier, Netherlands, in 1998.
6 Frustrated by the repeated shod inesses in pamphlets put out by some of the think tanks, I have sometimes said
undiplomatically that these think tanks are like “people’s democracies”: they describe themselves as what they
certainly are not! I have also argued recently that the public policy writings by academic economists such as myself
require the strictest standards: that they must reflect extensive scholarship, attention to clarity of writing, and
the benign view that the favourable influence of trade on aggregate incomes is a sufficient index
to the virtues of free trade, I do believe that trade altogetheris today a phenomenon that creates
economic insecurity. Today, comparative advantage is relatively “thin”: many industries are
“footloose”, meaning that slight changes in costs abroad can  undercut your competitiveness.
The reason is that financial markets have integrated a lot so that interest rates at which you
borrow are not as wide apart across countries as they used to be. Technology also diffuses
quickly and has converged rapidly among the OECD nations, for sure. Multinationals also move
around, seeking small but significant cost advantages. Rival producers in a product or industry in
many nations therefore face closely-spaced costs, and hence actual or potential loss of markets
due to sudden, small but effective shifts of comparative advantage. There is no great “buffer” or
cushion of cost advantage today in most industries. The result is greater volatility in comparative
advantage, driven by small changes in costs that are a fact of life. I call this the new phenomenon
of  kaleidoscopic comparative advantage. A flip side of the phenomenon is the widespread
notion that “international competition today has been greatly intensified”.
What this has done is to contribute to the greater labour turnover which has been
observed; and this itself may have put some pressure on the real wages of the unskilled workers
since, just as a rolling stone gathers no moss, a moving worker gains no on-the-job skills that
lead to increased earnings. But, another effect of this is to create an accentuated need to make
institutional changes to assist workers in coping with this turnover: adjustment assistance
programs, portable health insurance benefits when these are provided by employers (as in the
United States) etc. This reinforces the view, expressed forcefully in my slender 1988 book on
                                                                                                                                                            
willingness to become a public nuisance in the cause of advancing public good. Cf. Bhagwati,  A Stream of
Windows: Unsettling Reflections on Trade, Immigration and Democracy, MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1998.
Protectionism (MIT Press), that we need to accompany the freeing of trade and the growth of
trade with the institutional changes that increased exposure to international trade necessitates.
2. “Fair Trade” as Precondition for Free Trade
I must say that it is precisely the kaleidoscopic nature of current comparative advantage,
with the narrowing or thinning of comparative advantage that it signifies, that has contributed
enormously to the demands for “fair trade”. Since even a small cost advantage enjoyed by your
rivals abroad can be fatal to your health, you will begin to look over their shoulders to see if any
difference in their domestic institutions or policies gives them that extra cost advantage: and you
will lobby to iron it out, to harmonize standards or “cost burdens”. Hence, when there are
objections to Japanese keiretsus or to South Asian use of child labour for instance, the objections
are principally motivated by competitiveness considerations. And in fact, it is astonishing how
many such differences, which we would never have imagined to be relevant to trade issues, have
become now part of the trade agenda. More such “fair trade” arguments are just around the
corner: for instance, I would not be surprised if, down the road and despite how ludicrous it
appears now, population policies also became part of the trade agenda as the rich countries object
to “unfair trade” in labour-intensive goods by poor countries that have poor control over their
population growth.7
But, in conjunction with these demands, there are also morally-driven demands for
certain harmonization: e.g. human rights groups will object to the use of child labour even if the
children are the progeny of green men from Mars and the earth does not trade with Mars.
                                                
7 I have considered several moral-philosophical, economic, structural and political factors that drive the demands for
“fair trade” and harmonization, in Chapter 1 in Bhagwati and Robert Hudec (eds), Fair Trade and Harmonization:
Prerequisites for Free Trade?, Vol.s 1 and 2,  MIT Press: Cambridge, 1996. I select only a few in the text above.
These two principal, but wildly different, reasons for “fair trade” and harmonization as
prerequisites for free trade  raise two issues that have bedeviled the move to free trade and need
to be resolved with clarity:
First, it is necessary to understand that, when trade is considered “unfair” because of
differences in cost burdens due to differences in, say, environmental or labour standards, this is
generally speaking a conceptual error. For example, even if we accept the polluter pay principle,
there is no reason whatsoever why the payment for a unit carcinogen should be the same in India
as in Switzerland. Or, if clean air and clean water are both highly prized, Mexico may well
choose to devote its resources and energies to getting clean water first and clean air next as a
suitable priority whereas the United States may well choose to go the other route. In each case,
the cost burden will differ for the same industry across countries: and for perfectly sensible
reasons. It is illegitimate, even unfair, then to force your own standards down the throats of
others on grounds of unfair trade!
Again,  even if this is granted, there might be a worry about a “race to the bottom” which
may lead to a reductions of one’s own standards even when one does not care about unfair
competition per  se.  This race refers to the high-standards country forcing its own standards
down to retain or attract investment that would otherwise move to low-standards countries.
Theoretically, this is possible, of course, and a coordinated, cooperative solution can yield higher
incomes and even standards for each country than under a noncooperative equilibrium (though, it
must be emphasized that this cooperative equilibrium does not generally involve harmonization
of standards). But much empirical literature shows that this theoretically-correct fear is of little
empirical relevance since multinationals typically seem to use the more environmentally-friendly
technology  even when not required, and there is little evidence either that governments actually
lower standards in order to attract investments. Rather, the race to the bottom occurs typically on
the fiscal dimension where developing countries, or states within federal nations, competitively
offer cheaper land, subsidized inputs, tax holidays or tax breaks in order to attract investments.
Hence, on the usual “unfair trade” grounds, reflecting competitiveness considerations, I
see no reason to make harmonization or upgrading demands for standards, domestic institutional
and policy structures et.al. to be made part of the trade agenda. I am therefore against “linkage”
of  “fair trade” to free trade agendas and treaties as far as the competitiveness rationale is
concerned.
Second, however, linkage is also demanded at times for moral imperatives.  Trade with
countries that systematically violate civil and political rights, as China does, may be considered
anathema by human rights activists, for instance; so was apartheid. Similarly, at the “micro” level
of products produced by processes that are considered ethically unacceptable --- e.g. fur produced
with leghold traps, chicken produced in batteries, hogs raised in crowded farms, tuna caught in
purse seine nets etc.---, trade in such products may be denied.
These denials of trade may not be consequentialist in the sense that they are aimed at, and
to be judged by, their success in changing these unacceptable practices. I may decide not to sup
with the devil although the only consequence of that is that I lose a free meal. But most who wish
to deny or suspend trade with others do look for  efficacy of their actions.
Either way, the question that arises with trade treaties is one that has brought
environmentalists in particular into conflict with  free traders. These conflicts are twofold.
(i)  Free traders, and the WTO in fact, argue that if trade can be autom tically and
unilaterally suspended by a contracting party on moral grounds, then trade could fall
into chaos because morality is subjective and it can be indulged without constraint
(e.g. there is no scientific test to constrain its use, as in the hormone-fed beef dispute
between the EU and the US). On the other hand, they recognize that morality is
important and that you cannot get a country to eat “defiled” products, for instance, if
it does not want to: the days of Opium Wars are not gone altogether but the WTO
surely cannot be built on those principles! So, the sensible answer is to throw some
sand into the tank of unilateral moral denials of market access. The GATT/WTO
technique is to require that you pay some “compensation” or allow for “retaliatory”
tariffs as Ambassador Carla Hills used in the EU hormone-fed beef dispute while the
EU held on to its unilateral ban on such beef imports (and domestic production as
well). I see nothing wrong with that. And frankly, the current Shrimp/Turtle decision
against the US legislation unilaterally suspending WTO members’ market access for
shrimps harvested without the turtle-protecting devices is also sensible in my view
since it will prompt the United States into sitting down with the four plaintiffs who
have won and will, in turn, lead to a negotiated settlement in form of  continued US
legislation and attendant US compensation which could well take the form of
financing the relatively inexpensive (for rich countries) protective devices that
fishermen in these countries are being asked to use. The hysterical bridge-burning
reaction of lobbies such as Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen in this as in other instances,
as against bridge-building solutions favoured by the less militant environmental
groups working with the trade community, is exactly what we need in this area.
 I might remind you also that when the action is not unilateral, but you can get a
large   enough majority to go along with your moral views, then you can suspend
entire trade of a WTO member, or any specific offensive part thereof, thorugh
majorities set forth in the articles of the WTO. And then again, as with apartheid
which was against a GATT member, South Africa, UN embargo procedures are also
available. So, again, the agitated propaganda against the GATT as Gattzilla and the
 WTO as trampling on countries’ rights to pursue social and environmental agendas is
just that.
(ii)  But, while these conflicts relate to existing trade treaties such as the WTO, and the
rights and obligations that follow from them, there is the rather more dramatic conflict
that has arisen in the context of  freeing trade as at a new MTN Round or in the
context of the extension of NAFTA to South America. Again, the labour and
environmental lobbies argue for linkage to advance standards abroad. But economists
such as myself --- and many agree with me, as we petitioned President Clinton on this
very issue during the recent fast-track debate which he lost --- argue that the
advancement of such agendas on moral grounds through linkage to trade treaties is
plain inefficient.
      Here, we go back to the “killing two birds with one stone” analogy. Such linkage
creates obstacles to freeing trade when trade treaties should be about removing them
instead. So, you clutter up and slow down the freeing of trade, thus missing one bird.
At the same time, as citizens advancing the social, environmental and human rights
agendas, we lose because the choice of the precise content of these issues to be
included in trade treaties will inevitably reflect competitiveness considerations. E.g.
child labour is included in the proposed Social Clause at the WTO, but not
sweatshops or migrant labour rights which afflict the US itself pretty badly and where
the consequence of their inclusion in the Social Clause would have a disastrous
impact on US textile and agricultural trade. So, by distorting the social and human
rights agendas, we miss the other bird as well. In other words, we underachieve both
trade liberalization and progress on social and human rights and on environmental
objectives.
The efficient answer then is to use trade treaties to advance freer trade and to reap the
gains from trade, while pursuing the other agendas proactively at different and
appropriate institutions. Thus, the UNICEF could pursue not merely child labour
issues but also several other issues relating to children’s rights: e.g. the right to avoid
capital punishment, which is not available in the US for instance in several states
which have passed legislation which permits adults to be executed while also treating
children as adults in certain cases. The ILO could pursue rights at work. The UNEP
could pursue environmental agendas. True, these agencies are not equipped
adequately to undertake these  tasks. But then we need to strengthen them. I would
even urge that they address themselves to impartial and effective monitoring and
review of nations’ practices in regard to their conformity to conventions, norms et.al.,
much as the WTO now undertakes Trade Policy Reviews with great effect. The mere
exposure of a country’s policies in a coherent and impartial fashion can bring moral
pressure to bear for change in the  desired direction. I call it the Dracula Effect:
expose evil to sunlight and it begins to shrivel and then die.
The Free Trade Agenda Now
That brings me to  the principal task before us today. Faced with demands from civil
society, often talking in uncivil terms, politicians have begun to think of accommodating the
demands on the trading system in the only terms that they can usually appreciate: what can be
done to buy peace minimally from these groups and get along with the important task of freeing
trade?
But that is exactly the wrong way to set about these problems. Both agendas are of the
utmost importance; and each must be pursued aggressively and also efficiently, free from
crippling linkage.
As an economist, I want to see free trade advance efficiently and fully. I must add that I
also see free trade as an important moral force for good since we cannot effectively rescue the
world’s millions from continuing deprivation and poverty without pursuing wealth-generating
policies --- I call growth the  activist “pull up” strategy as against the passive “trickle down”
strategy. Growth will also, over time, likely induce values and institutions such as democracy and
respect for human rights.
But as a citizen, I want the social and human-rights agendas advanced with all speed,
instead of relying simply on these long run processes. If a hapless woman is screaming for help
as her husband beats her, it is ludicrous to say: hang in there; as incomes grow, things will get
better for you. No, you have to get in right there and nail the husband to the wall.
And, so, free traders must now walk hand in hand with the civil society groups seeking
the social agendas. It is not as difficult a task as the first shock of discovering each other seemed
to suggest. In fact, it is the task for the first decade of the next millennium.
